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Limited Partnership Agreement: Waterfall, Key Person, MFN

The limited partnership agreement sets a fund's waterfall, key person trigger and removal votes. See what ILPA asks for and what to settle before LPs read it.

Abstract glass cover for a guide to the limited partnership agreement: three stacked glowing discs on black
What this covers
01Waterfall: ILPA recommends the whole-of-fund model

LPs are paid in the order the waterfall sets; a deal-by-deal model needs realized cost plus fees back, lower-of-cost-or-market marks and carry in escrow.

02Key person: ILPA page 19 asks 180 days to permanence

ILPA asks that a key person event suspend the investment period automatically, and that the suspension become permanent unless a supermajority of LPs reinstates it. Page 23 says 90 days.

03Removal: a majority for cause, two-thirds for no fault

ILPA asks for a majority in interest to remove the GP for cause and two-thirds in interest without fault, with carry forfeited or reduced.

04MFN: one $187,500 discount becomes $450,000 a year

In the example, a 25 basis point discount to a $75M LP costs $450,000 a year once a $105M LP elects it, because MFN elections typically run upward by commitment.

05Reporting: ILPA Template 2.0 adds expense lines

Template 2.0 shows internal chargebacks and subscription line costs separately, so the LPA's expense clauses need precise wording.

A limited partnership agreement (LPA, sometimes called the limited partner agreement) is the contract that sets up a private fund: it names the general partner who manages the fund, the limited partners who commit capital, and the rules for fees, carried interest, distributions, key person events and removal.

This guide is for GPs, LPs and their counsel, and it covers the agreement of a private fund. Search results for the term also include two-person business partnerships, which follow different rules.

Figure 01The LPA sets what each party does at every stage of a fund's cash cycle, from commitment to distributionWho acts at each stage, by party. The waterfall, highlighted, is the stage that decides how proceeds are shared.
The LPA sets what each party does at every stage of a fund's cash cycle, from commitment to distributionSwimlane with three lanes, the general partner, the limited partners and the LP committee, across four stages: commitment, capital call, investment and distribution. Both the general partner and the limited partners commit; the general partner calls capital, the limited partners fund the call, the general partner invests with the advisory committee consulted, and the waterfall pays proceeds out to the limited partners.CommitmentCapital callInvestmentDistributionGeneral partnerLimited partnersLP committeeGP moneyCommits its ownmoney; ILPAputs standardpractice at 2-5%of fund capitalCommitmentSigns asubscriptionagreement forthe most it canbe asked to fundCapital callDraws downpart of eachcommitment, itsown included,as it findsinvestmentsFundsPays its shareof each callinto the fundInvestmentBuys, holds andlater sellsholdings; a keyperson eventcan suspend thisAdvisesConsulted by theGP on specificissues duringthe fund's lifeWaterfallPays proceedsout in theorder the LPAsets and earnscarried interestDistributionReceives itsshare of theproceeds underthe waterfallThe LPA sets what each party does at every stage of a fund's cash cycle, from commitment to distributionSwimlane with three lanes, the general partner, the limited partners and the LP committee, across four stages: commitment, capital call, investment and distribution. Both the general partner and the limited partners commit; the general partner calls capital, the limited partners fund the call, the general partner invests with the advisory committee consulted, and the waterfall pays proceeds out to the limited partners.General partnerLimited partnersLP committeeCommitmentGP moneyCommits itsown money;ILPA putsstandardpractice at2-5% offund capitalCommitmentSigns asubscriptionagreementfor the mostit can beasked to fundCapital callCapital callDraws downpart of eachcommitment,its ownincluded, asit findsinvestmentsFundsPays its shareof each callinto the fundInvestmentInvestmentBuys, holdsand later sellsholdings; akey personevent cansuspend thisAdvisesConsulted bythe GP onspecificissues duringthe fund's lifeDistributionWaterfallPays proceedsout in theorder the LPAsets and earnscarried interestDistributionReceives itsshare of theproceeds underthe waterfall
Figure 01 data: The LPA sets what each party does at every stage of a fund's cash cycle, from commitment to distribution
PhasePartyStep
CommitmentGeneral partnerGP money: Commits its own money; ILPA puts standard practice at 2-5% of fund capital
CommitmentLimited partnersCommitment: Signs a subscription agreement for the most it can be asked to fund
Capital callGeneral partnerCapital call: Draws down part of each commitment, its own included, as it finds investments
Capital callLimited partnersFunds: Pays its share of each call into the fund
InvestmentGeneral partnerInvestment: Buys, holds and later sells holdings; a key person event can suspend this
InvestmentLP committeeAdvises: Consulted by the GP on specific issues during the fund's life
DistributionGeneral partnerWaterfall: Pays proceeds out in the order the LPA sets and earns carried interest
DistributionLimited partnersDistribution: Receives its share of the proceeds under the waterfall
Source: ILPA Principles 3.0, page 41 (GP commitment); stages as described in this article.

What does a limited partnership agreement do in a private fund?

Every capital call and every distribution in a fund runs through this one contract. Each limited partner (LP) signs a subscription agreement for a commitment, the most it can be asked to fund. The general partner (GP) draws that money down in capital calls as it finds investments, and the agreement sets how the proceeds are shared when those investments pay out.

Under a limited partnership agreement, the general partner runs the fund: it picks the investments, calls the capital and answers to the investors for the results. The limited partners fund it and stay out of day-to-day decisions, which is the trade that limits their exposure to the amount they commit.

One lever is the GP's own money. ILPA's Principles, written for private equity funds, say standard practice is for the GP to commit 2-5 percent of the capital of the fund as a whole (ILPA Principles 3.0, page 41). When a private placement agent takes a fund to market, this is a term LPs look at, and a GP committing well under ILPA's range should be ready to explain it.

Investors keep a say through a small committee of LPs, the limited partner advisory committee (LPAC), which the GP consults on specific issues during the fund's life.

The structure is standard enough that ILPA, the Institutional Limited Partners Association, publishes the ILPA model LPA in two Delaware law-based versions, one with a whole-of-fund waterfall and one deal-by-deal. About 20 attorneys acting for GPs and for LPs built them as a limited partnership agreement template for a traditional private equity buyout fund, to cut the cost and complexity of negotiating each agreement from scratch.

The private placement memorandum discloses the fund to prospective investors, the subscription agreement commits an LP to an amount, and the LPA is the contract that governs the partnership once the money is in.

Either side can start from the ILPA model, and the signed version is negotiated between each manager and its investors. It sits inside a wider set of entities that venture capital fund structures lays out for venture funds.

The economics a limited partnership agreement sets, and where ILPA pushes

Whether the GP is paid carry before or after the whole fund returns capital is set by one clause of the limited partnership agreement, the distribution waterfall. A whole-of-fund waterfall pays carried interest, the GP's share of the profit, only after LPs have received their contributed capital back across the whole fund, plus the preferred return in ILPA's formulation.

A deal-by-deal waterfall pays carry as each investment is sold. ILPA names the whole-of-fund model as its recommended approach (ILPA Principles 3.0, page 10), and the ILPA model LPA offers both versions.

Take three illustrative investments of $20 million each, all made before the first sale and sold for $40 million, $10 million and $50 million, with 20 percent carry and no fees or preferred return.

A whole-of-fund waterfall pays carry once, after the last sale: $8.0 million. A deal-by-deal waterfall pays $4.0 million after the first sale and $10.0 million in total, so the GP holds $2.0 million more than the fund earned until a clawback returns it.

Figure 02IllustrativeA deal-by-deal waterfall pays carry in year 3 and overpays by $2.0 million; a whole-of-fund waterfall pays once, in year 7Limited partnership agreement example: cumulative carry paid to the GP, in millions of dollars, with three $20M investments all made before the first sale and sold in order at $40M, $10M and $50M, 20 percent carry, no fees or preferred return.
A deal-by-deal waterfall pays carry in year 3 and overpays by $2.0 million; a whole-of-fund waterfall pays once, in year 7Illustrative comparison of cumulative carried interest paid to the GP, in millions of dollars, for three investments sold in sequence. Whole-of-fund waterfall: $0 after the first sale, $0 after the second, $8.0 million after the third. Deal-by-deal waterfall: $4.0 million after the first sale, $4.0 million after the second, $10.0 million after the third, which is $2.0 million more than the fund earned.Whole-of-fund waterfallDeal-by-deal waterfall$0$2M$4M$6M$8M$10M$0$4.0M+$4.0MAfter sale 1, year 3$0$4.0M+$4.0MAfter sale 2, year 5$8.0M$10.0M+$2.0MAfter sale 3, year 7A deal-by-deal waterfall pays carry in year 3 and overpays by $2.0 million; a whole-of-fund waterfall pays once, in year 7Illustrative comparison of cumulative carried interest paid to the GP, in millions of dollars, for three investments sold in sequence. Whole-of-fund waterfall: $0 after the first sale, $0 after the second, $8.0 million after the third. Deal-by-deal waterfall: $4.0 million after the first sale, $4.0 million after the second, $10.0 million after the third, which is $2.0 million more than the fund earned.Whole-of-fund waterfallDeal-by-deal waterfallAfter sale 1, year 3$0$4.0MGap +$4.0MAfter sale 2, year 5$0$4.0MGap +$4.0MAfter sale 3, year 7$8.0M$10.0MGap +$2.0M
Figure 02 data: A deal-by-deal waterfall pays carry in year 3 and overpays by $2.0 million; a whole-of-fund waterfall pays once, in year 7
ScenarioWhole-of-fund waterfallDeal-by-deal waterfallGap
After sale 1, year 3$0$4.0M+$4.0M
After sale 2, year 5$0$4.0M+$4.0M
After sale 3, year 7$8.0M$10.0M+$2.0M
Illustrative example from this article, not market data. Waterfall models as described by ILPA Principles 3.0, page 10.

Where an LPA does use a deal-by-deal model, ILPA asks for three protections: LPs get back all realized cost plus all fees and expenses to date, unrealized investments are carried at the lower of cost or market, and accrued carry sits in escrow with significant reserves, plus additional reserves for potential clawback liabilities (page 10).

A GP that offers a deal-by-deal waterfall to institutional LPs picks the longer negotiation, because each of those three protections becomes a point to argue.

ILPA asks for accrued carry to sit in escrow with significant reserves, for example 30 percent of carry distributions or more.

Fees get their own rules in the agreement. After the investment period, management fees are customarily based on net invested capital, according to Hamilton Lane, so the base is the capital the fund has invested. ILPA asks that no fees be charged to portfolio companies and that any charged be 100% offset against the management fee, with exempt fees rare and defined in the LPA (ILPA Principles 3.0, page 13).

Organization costs, the legal and set-up expenses a fund passes to its LPs, get a cap. ILPA says to size it to the fund, offset any excess against the management fee and, for a successor fund, tie an increase to specific costs such as placement agent expenses.

LPA term

Where to read it in ILPA Principles 3.0

Page

Carried interest

Carry on net profits, none on current income distributions, ideally with a hard hurdle: carry only on profit above the preferred return

10

Portfolio company fees

No portfolio company fees; any charged are 100% offset against the management fee; ILPA says exempt fees should be rare and defined in the LPA

13

Organization costs

Capped to fund size, with any excess offset against the management fee; a successor fund's cap can rise for specific costs such as placement agent expenses

14

Clawback

An interim clawback test should be performed

19

The key person provision

ILPA asks that a key person event, like a for-cause event, suspend a fund's investment period automatically.

The key person provision names the people the LPs are underwriting when they sign the limited partnership agreement, and ILPA says they should be those who determine investment outcomes. It asks that the suspension become permanent within 180 days unless a defined supermajority of LPs reinstates it (ILPA Principles 3.0, page 19). The summary of recommended thresholds on page 23 gives 90 days; page 19 is the full text.

On a key person event, page 19 asks for two things:

  • No new investments or other expenditures from fund assets, including recycling and borrowing, unless the LPA expressly permits it.

  • An interim clawback test, the check that the GP hasn't taken more carry than it has earned.

In my view a GP will want to keep the key person list short, since every extra name is another trigger that can freeze the investment period.

ILPA also warns against drafting the key person group so widely that the departure of someone the LPs relied on triggers nothing. It asks that any change to the provision need a majority in interest of the LPs.

How LPs can remove the general partner

Removal rights sit on page 20 of ILPA's principles. For cause, ILPA says a majority in interest of LPs, meaning votes weighted by commitment, should be able to suspend or end the commitment period, remove the GP or dissolve the fund. Without fault, the bar is higher at two-thirds in interest (ILPA Principles 3.0, page 20).

Figure 03ILPA asks for a higher LP vote to remove a general partner without cause than with causeShare of LPs, weighted by commitment, whose vote ILPA recommends for each step. Majority votes are drawn at 50% and mean more than half.
ILPA asks for a higher LP vote to remove a general partner without cause than with causeBar chart of LP vote thresholds. Suspending or ending the commitment period for cause needs a majority in interest, as does removing the GP or dissolving the fund for cause. Removal or dissolution without fault needs two-thirds in interest.0%20%40%60%80%Suspend or end thecommitment period, for causeOver 50%Remove the GP or dissolvethe fund, for causeOver 50%Remove the GP ordissolve the fund, no fault66.7%ILPA asks for a higher LP vote to remove a general partner without cause than with causeBar chart of LP vote thresholds. Suspending or ending the commitment period for cause needs a majority in interest, as does removing the GP or dissolving the fund for cause. Removal or dissolution without fault needs two-thirds in interest.0%20%40%60%80%Suspend or end the commitment period, for causeOver 50%Remove the GP or dissolve the fund, for causeOver 50%Remove the GP or dissolve the fund, no fault66.7%
Figure 03 data: ILPA asks for a higher LP vote to remove a general partner without cause than with cause
ItemValue
Suspend or end the commitment period, for causeOver 50%
Remove the GP or dissolve the fund, for causeOver 50%
Remove the GP or dissolve the fund, no fault66.7%
Source: ILPA Principles 3.0, page 20, as cited in this section.

After a no-fault removal, ILPA asks that a majority vote in interest be enough to appoint the liquidator. On any removal, it expects a meaningful forfeit of or reduction to carried interest.

Which terms belong in the LPA, and which stay in a side letter?

Terms that most LPs ask for belong in the limited partnership agreement; a side letter, a separate agreement between the GP and one LP, carries the rest: a reporting right, an excuse right, a fee discount.

ILPA agrees: GPs should seek whenever possible to move terms common across the majority of side letters into the LPA, and ILPA says the cost of negotiating side letters should be considered an organizational expense, subject to the agreed cap (ILPA Principles 3.0, page 14). Move them early: each side letter that repeats a common term is another round the fund pays for.

The Fifth Circuit vacated the SEC's Private Fund Adviser Rule in its entirety on 5 June 2024, so the rule's preferential-treatment restrictions and disclosure requirements never took effect (Paul, Weiss). The rule gives a GP no reason to refuse a side letter, so the LPA, the MFN clause and what LPs ask for set those terms.

Figure 04IllustrativeTerms most LPs ask for belong in the LPA; terms tied to one investor's position stay in a side letterRelative positions on two questions: across, how far a term changes what other LPs pay or receive; up, how many LPs ask for it. An order, not measured data.
Terms most LPs ask for belong in the LPA; terms tied to one investor's position stay in a side letterMatrix. Top right, terms most LPs ask for that change others' economics, such as fee offsets and key person rights, belong in the LPA. Top left, standard reporting detail also belongs in the LPA. Bottom left, terms tied to one investor, such as its tax status, investment-policy excuse right and LPAC seat, fit a side letter. Bottom right, a fee discount changes other LPs' economics and needs MFN scrutiny; a co-invest first look sits near the middle line and is often carved out of the election.Changes other LPs' economics →NoneAsked for by most LPs →One LPSTANDARD TERMSFUND-WIDE ECONOMICSONE LP'S POSITIONMFN DECISIONFee offsetsKey person rightsStandard reportingTax statusInvestment-policy excuse rightLPAC seatCo-invest first lookFee discountTerms most LPs ask for belong in the LPA; terms tied to one investor's position stay in a side letterMatrix. Top right, terms most LPs ask for that change others' economics, such as fee offsets and key person rights, belong in the LPA. Top left, standard reporting detail also belongs in the LPA. Bottom left, terms tied to one investor, such as its tax status, investment-policy excuse right and LPAC seat, fit a side letter. Bottom right, a fee discount changes other LPs' economics and needs MFN scrutiny; a co-invest first look sits near the middle line and is often carved out of the election.Changes other LPs' economics →NoneAsked for by most LPs →One LPSTANDARD TERMSFUND-WIDE ECONOMICSONE LP'S POSITIONMFN DECISIONFee offsetsKey person rightsStandard reportingTax statusInvestment-policy excuse rightLPAC seatCo-invest first lookFee discount
Figure 04 data: Terms most LPs ask for belong in the LPA; terms tied to one investor's position stay in a side letter
ItemChanges other LPs' economics (0 to 100)Asked for by most LPs (0 to 100)Note
Fee offsets8882
Key person rights6672
Standard reporting1480
Tax status810
Investment-policy excuse right2438
LPAC seat3826
Co-invest first look4646
Fee discount9014
Illustrative example from this article, sorted using ILPA Principles 3.0, page 14, and the CMS carve-outs cited below.

An investor such as a fund of funds may need terms tied to its own regulatory or investment policy, and those are the terms a side letter exists for. Anything that changes what other LPs pay or receive raises a second decision: whether the most favored nation clause lets them elect it.

How does a most favored nation clause spread one concession?

A most favored nation (MFN) clause lets an LP elect terms the GP granted to another LP. CMS describes the election as typically tiered: an investor can elect another investor's terms only if its commitment is equal to or higher than that investor's (CMS).

“equal to or higher than such other investor's commitment”

CMSSide letters and MFN

CMS gives some common carve-outs from the election as examples, and an LPA may include any of them:

  • An investor's own legal, regulatory or tax position, or its investment policies

  • First-close status

  • A seat on the LPAC

  • A first look at co-investments

Managers subject to the AIFMD must also disclose the nature of special arrangements and which types of investor can receive them.

A seat on the LPAC or a first look at co-investments belongs to one investor and is often excluded from the election. A fee discount isn't among those examples, and CMS itself lists fee reductions for larger or first close investors among common side-letter terms. Whether a discount spreads is therefore a drafting choice: unless the LPA carves it out, it spreads up the tiers.

Take an illustration: a GP gives a first LP with a $75 million commitment a fee discount of 25 basis points, with tiered MFN elections and no carve-out in the LPA. That's $187,500 a year.

A second LP with a $105 million commitment elects the same terms, because its commitment is higher, and the discount costs another $262,500 a year. The total is $450,000 a year, or $4.5 million over ten years if the fee base stays at committed capital.

The $75 million LP can't elect the larger LP's terms, because the tiered election only runs upward. In this example only a carve-out in the LPA stops the second LP's election, so price the first discount as if every larger LP will elect it.

Figure 05IllustrativeOne 25 basis point fee discount costs the GP $450,000 a year once a second LP elects itIn this example, the management fee given up each year, in US dollars: the first LP's discount, the second LP's election of the same terms, and the total.
One 25 basis point fee discount costs the GP $450,000 a year once a second LP elects itIllustrative example. A 25 basis point fee discount on a $75 million commitment gives up $187,500 a year. A second LP with a $105 million commitment elects the same discount, adding $262,500 a year, so the GP gives up $450,000 a year in total.$0K$100K$200K$300K$400K$500K$187,500First LP, $75M+$262,500Second LP, $105M$450,000Given up each yearOne 25 basis point fee discount costs the GP $450,000 a year once a second LP elects itIllustrative example. A 25 basis point fee discount on a $75 million commitment gives up $187,500 a year. A second LP with a $105 million commitment elects the same discount, adding $262,500 a year, so the GP gives up $450,000 a year in total.$0K$200K$400K$600KFirst LP, $75M$187,500Second LP, $105M+$262,500Given up each year$450,000
Figure 05 data: One 25 basis point fee discount costs the GP $450,000 a year once a second LP elects it
StepChangeRunning total
First LP, $75M$187.5K
Second LP, $105M+$262.5K$450.0K
Given up each year$450.0K
Illustrative example from this article, not market data. MFN election rule as described by CMS.

What the ILPA reporting template 2.0 changes for fund terms

ILPA released Reporting Template 2.0 in January 2025. It is intended to replace the 2016 template for funds still in their investment period during Q1 2026 or starting on or after 1 January 2026, and it covers fees, expenses and carried interest (ILPA).

The changes reach the LPA's expense clauses. RSM, an accounting firm, flags a new internal chargeback section for costs GPs charge for internal-team work that the management fee does not otherwise cover, a more granular section for external partnership expenses, and subscription line interest and fees shown apart from bank fees. Funds launched before Q1 2026 and past their investment phase can stay on the 2016 template or opt in.

A GP that expects to charge the fund for internal-team work should say so in the expense clause, because the template will now show those charges on their own line.

Template change

What LPs see

Clause to check

Internal chargebacks

Costs GPs charge for internal-team work that the management fee does not otherwise cover

The expense clause: what the GP may charge the fund

External partnership expenses

A more granular breakdown

Organization and operating expense definitions and caps

Subscription line costs

Interest and fees shown apart from bank fees

The borrowing clause: purpose, limits and who bears the cost

How spectup runs a fund placement around the limited partnership agreement

spectup is engaged and paid by the fund, which is the GP's side only. The fund's counsel drafts the LPA and negotiates it with the LPs and their counsel. The vehicle is formed by that counsel or through spectup's partner law firm, which does the legal work on fund formation; spectup is not a law firm and gives no legal advice.

Our work starts from the questions LPs bring to a draft, such as the waterfall, the removal votes and the MFN tiers. We prepare the GP and its counsel with answers before the first meeting and run the investor process around them. In spectup's LP sentiment study, a typical LP sees about two fund decks a month.

We also draft the deck and the private placement memorandum alongside the LPA, so the raise can start while the fund is still being formed, and the fund's securities counsel reviews its legal and regulatory parts. spectup does not negotiate terms; the GP and its counsel do.

The LPA also decides who bears the cost of the placement itself. ILPA ties a successor fund's higher organization-cost cap to specific costs such as placement agent expenses, so the GP's counsel should settle that line before the memorandum goes out.

The memorandum and the LPA have to tell the same story. ILPA asks for the allocation of broken deal and co-investment expenses to be disclosed consistently across the PPM, the LPA, the marketing materials and any filings. The same match is worth making for fees and every other expense term, because one that differs between the PPM and the LPA is an avoidable question.

The LP list for a fund comes from three sources used together: 440+ allocators we have closed with, 2,500+ investors and LPs we have been in front of together with clients, and 30+ partner firms. spectup's record to date is $760M+ advised, raised or placed.

We take funds of $50M or more, and a fund placement typically runs eight to twelve months.

Which clauses to settle before the first LPs read the draft

Work down these five points with your counsel before the draft goes out, whether the vehicle is a blind-pool fund or a continuation fund buying existing assets:

  1. The economics: waterfall type, carry base, portfolio fee offset, organization cost cap and clawback test, each checked against ILPA Principles 3.0.

  2. The key person provision and the removal votes: who the key persons are, what a suspension stops, and the thresholds for cause and no fault.

  3. The side-letter policy and the MFN tiers: which terms move into the LPA, which stay outside the election, and where the commitment tiers fall.

  4. The reporting and expense lines: internal chargebacks, external expenses and subscription line costs, drafted for ILPA Reporting Template 2.0.

  5. The disclosure match: the PPM, the LPA and the deck say the same thing about fees and expenses.

If you're about to take a fund to LPs, mark your draft against the ILPA model limited partnership agreement and settle each point first.

/ Insights

Three conclusions

01
Settle the waterfall before anything else

Every other economic term is read through the waterfall. Offer the whole-of-fund model ILPA recommends, or arrive with the three protections it asks for on a deal-by-deal model.

02
Name the key persons who decide investments

ILPA ties key person status to the people who determine investment outcomes. Name those people, and know what a suspension stops, because ILPA asks that it become permanent within 180 days (its page 23 summary says 90) unless a supermajority of LPs reinstates it.

03
Write the MFN tiers before the first side letter

Unless the LPA carves it out, a discount granted to one LP spreads to every larger LP that elects it. Decide the commitment tiers and carve-outs in the LPA, so the first side letter doesn't set the price of the last.

/ Answers

Limited partnership agreement: questions readers ask

6 questions on fund placement and GP capital, answered by Edwin Mik, Partner & Head of IR.

01What is a limited partnership agreement in private equity?

It's the contract between a fund's general partner and its limited partners: management fee, carried interest, distributions, key person events and the LPs' right to remove the GP.

02What is the difference between a PPM and an LPA?

The private placement memorandum discloses the fund's strategy, team, terms and risks to prospective investors. The limited partner agreement is the binding contract they sign into, and the two have to agree on fees and expenses. The fund's counsel drafts the LPA; spectup drafts the memorandum, and the fund's securities counsel reviews its legal and regulatory parts.

03How many LPs can a venture capital fund have?

A fund relying on section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(1), as published by Cornell Law School's Legal Information Institute) can have no more than 100 beneficial owners and no public offering; a qualifying venture capital fund under section 3(c)(1)(C), with no more than $12M of capital contributions and uncalled commitments, can have 250. The $12M figure comes from SEC rule 3c-7 (17 CFR 270.3c-7, Release IC-35305, 89 FR 70479, effective 30 September 2024), which adjusted the $10 million in the statute for inflation. Other exemptions carry different limits, so counsel confirms which applies.

04What is the difference between LP and GP in private equity?

The general partner runs the fund, makes the investments and earns the management fee and carried interest. The limited partners provide the capital and stay passive. The GP also commits its own money; for private equity funds ILPA puts standard practice at 2-5 percent of fund capital.

05How does a limited partner get paid?

Through the distribution waterfall the LPA sets, which fixes the order in which proceeds go to the LPs and to the GP's carried interest. ILPA recommends the whole-of-fund model and asks for carry on net profits, with none on current income distributions.

06Should a fund hire a private placement agent before or after the LPA is drafted?

Alongside it. spectup's placement work can start while the vehicle is still being formed: the fund's counsel drafts the LPA, spectup drafts the private placement memorandum to match it, and the fund's securities counsel reviews its legal and regulatory parts. The GP and its counsel negotiate the LPA with the LPs and their counsel; a placement agent does not. spectup prepares the GP and its counsel for the questions LPs raise and runs the investor process.

Edwin Mik, Partner & Head of IR at spectup
Written by

Edwin Mik

Partner & Head of IR

Formerly at Barclays, Apax Partners and Euronext, Edwin knows how investors screen a raise. He works out who is allocating now, which of the 440+ relationships is the right first call, and what they need to see.

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