Venture Capital Fund Structure: What LPs Check First
Venture capital fund structure explained for GPs and LPs: who holds what, and how the fee, carry, hurdle and waterfall pay out, with a worked $100M example.

LPs supply the capital and stay passive, the GP controls the fund, and a management company employs the team and receives the fee.
Cooley gives 2.5% of committed capital as the historical venture reference. After the investment period the rate, the base or both are reduced.
20% is the widely accepted starting point. A preferred return of around 8% is common in private equity and less so in early-stage venture.
In the $100M example the GP earns 20% of the $200M profit, $40M. With no catch-up the GP earns $28M.
In Cooley's 2026 survey roughly 90% of funds reviewed used a European waterfall, and most funds carry some form of clawback.
Two $100M later-stage venture funds with the same 20% carry and 8% preferred return can pay their GP $40M or $28M on the same $300M of distributions. The gap is one clause in the venture capital fund structure, the GP catch-up; the fee, the carry rate and the payout order sit around it.
A venture capital fund structure is a limited partnership: limited partners (LPs) supply the capital, a general partner (GP) controls the fund and earns a share of the profit called carried interest, and a management company employs the team for an annual fee. Counsel forms the vehicle. The rules and market terms are US ones.
| Step | Leads to |
|---|---|
| Limited partners (Supply the capital, stay passive) | The fund [commits capital] |
| General partner (Controls the fund, receives the carry) | end |
| The fund (A limited partnership) | Portfolio companies [invests]; Management company [management fee]; General partner |
| Portfolio companies (Receive the investments) | Distributions [exits] |
| Management company (Employs the team, receives the fee) | end |
| Distributions (Back to LPs first, then carry to the GP) | end |
What is a venture capital fund structure?
In Cooley's primer on the GP and management company, the GP is "the entity that controls the fund": it calls capital, makes the investments and signs for the partnership.
The GP entity has no staff of its own. The management company does, and it's "the operating company": it hires the team, signs the lease, runs the systems and receives the management fee. A sponsor that forms Fund II usually forms a Fund II GP for it, which winds down with the fund, while the management company carries on across funds.
4 columns. Drag the table sideways; the first column stays put.
Entity | What it is | Who controls it | What it receives |
|---|---|---|---|
The fund | A limited partnership that holds the investments | The GP | Capital from LPs, then the proceeds of its investments |
Limited partners | Investors who commit capital and stay passive | Not involved in running the fund | Distributions after the waterfall |
General partner | One entity per fund, exercising the GP's rights under the LPA | The sponsor's owners | Carried interest and the return on the GP's own capital |
Management company | The operating business that spans several funds | The sponsor's owners | The management fee |
A manager can run more vehicles beside the main fund: parallel funds, alternative investment vehicles (AIVs) and co-investment vehicles. Cooley's management fee primer says fee mechanics "become more complicated" once they exist. Parallel funds should be coordinated so investors bear fees in line with their relative commitments, and an AIV raises the question whether it pays a fee itself or sits inside the main fund's fee base.
US law adds a layer. Among other conditions, a fund counts as a venture capital fund for the SEC's adviser exemption only if it holds no more than 20% of capital contributions and uncalled commitments in non-qualifying assets, borrows at most 15% of that base for at most 120 calendar days, and offers no redemption rights except in extraordinary circumstances (17 CFR 275.203(l)-1).
Every LP, a fund of funds as much as a family office, signs the limited partnership agreement (LPA), the contract that sets the fee, the carry and the payout order, and side letters vary it for individual investors.
A private placement agent takes the finished structure to LPs, and the terms below are the ones they read in the papers.
What does the management fee pay for, and when does it step down?
The management fee is the manager's operating budget: salaries, rent, systems, fund administration and investor reporting. The GP's profit comes from carry. Cooley's November 2026 management fee primer notes that during the investment period fees are "often charged on aggregate committed capital", because the manager has to be ready to put the whole commitment to work.
For mainstream venture funds the historical reference point has often been 2.5% of committed capital, and on a $100M fund, 2.5% is $2.5M a year. Smaller funds feel it most, since rent and salaries don't shrink in proportion to the fund.
"2 and 20" is the shorthand for a 2% fee and 20% carry; Cooley traces it largely to private equity, and venture funds often start from 2.5%.
After the investment period many funds reduce the fee base, and many others cut the rate and keep the base at committed capital. There are three shapes:
Rate step down: the percentage falls and the base stays. For example, a venture fund might go from 2.5% of committed capital to 2% or 1.75% of the same base.
Base step down: the rate stays and the base changes, for example from committed to invested capital: 2% of one, then 2% of the other.
Double step down: both fall, for example from 2% of committed capital to 1.5% of remaining invested capital. It turns up more often later in a fund's life.
Managers tend to prefer a rate step down because the fee dollars stay predictable, and smaller venture funds use it more often. LPs tend to prefer a base step down, since a late-life fee on the full commitment charges for assets already sold or written off.
When the manager or its affiliates collect director, advisory or transaction fees from portfolio companies, investors generally expect those amounts to offset the management fee, often at 100%.
| Track | What | When |
|---|---|---|
| Investment period | New investments | 0 to 5 years |
| Management fee | On commitments | 0 to 5 years |
| Management fee | Stepped down | 5 to 10 years |
| Management fee | May continue | 10 to 15 years |
| Fund term | Core term | 0 to 10 years |
| Fund term | Extensions, liquidation | 10 to 15 years |
How much should the GP commit in a venture capital fund structure, and how is it funded?
The GP commitment is the manager's own money in the fund, next to the LPs'. Many funds provide for 1% to 2% of fund commitments, which Cooley's primer on structuring the GP calls "a common reference point".
The amount moves with the manager, the strategy, the investor base and the fund size, and on a $100M fund it comes to $1M to $2M.
Someone has to fund it. The members of the GP, or related persons, usually commit capital to the GP so that it can commit to the fund, and they share in the return on that capital. Funding can mirror the carry split, the "lockstep" model, but it doesn't have to: one partner might hold 20% of the carry and fund 10% of the commitment.
What is carried interest, and what is the 20% a share of?
Carried interest is a share of a fund's profits, typically 20%, that the managers earn once investors have their capital back, plus a preferred return where the fund has one. Cooley's carried interest primer calls it rare for a mainstream fund to set a rate below that.
“…it remains widely accepted that the starting point is 20%”
Cooley LLPPrimer: Carried Interest in Private Equity and Venture Capital Funds, 10 June 2026
In "2 and 20", the fee funds the platform now, while the carry pays only if the fund performs, often many years later.
Some funds raise the rate with performance. In Cooley's 2026 survey of private fund terms, 34% of the funds reviewed had some form of premium carry, a rate above 20% that is either flat or earned through returns.
A fund might pay 20% carry in general, 25% above a 2.5x return on contributed capital and 30% above 3x, more commonly with a catch-up so that the higher rate applies to all gains from the first dollar.
On carried interest tax, US taxpayers face the holding-period test in Section 1061 of the Internal Revenue Code: gains on carried interest qualify for long-term capital gain treatment only after three years, where the general rule is one year.
How the rule applies to a given partner is a question for tax counsel.
What is a hurdle rate, and how does it work?
Funds use hurdle rate for two different tests, so check which one a term sheet means. In everyday use it's the preferred return, the annual percentage on contributed capital LPs receive before the GP earns carry, "often historically around 8%" in funds that have one, per Cooley. The same primer keeps "hurdle" for a higher threshold such as 2.5x, which lifts carry from 20% to 25%.
Early-stage venture funds have generally had no preferred return. They more commonly return contributed capital to LPs before the GP takes carry, because portfolios with little revenue and uneven exit timing make an annual return test hard to apply. Later-stage venture and growth funds include one more often, and a preferred return is much more common in private equity.
Where there's a preferred return, the catch-up comes next. It is "the mechanism used to move the economics to the agreed sharing ratio".
A catch-up can be full: the GP takes 100% of the next distributions until it holds 20% of all profit so far. A tapered one pays a larger-than-normal share, but less than 100%, until the same point. With none, carry applies only to profit above the hurdle, and the LPA records which of the three the fund uses.
How the waterfall pays out in a venture capital fund structure, worked through on $100M
The numbers are illustrative and belong to no real fund. The example is a later-stage venture or growth fund, since early-stage funds usually have no preferred return. The assumptions:
LPs paid in $100M, fees and expenses included.
The fund distributes $300M over its life.
An 8% preferred return has accrued to $60M by the time of distribution.
The split is 80/20, the waterfall is whole-fund and the GP has a full catch-up.
4 columns. Drag the table sideways; the first column stays put.
Tier | Rule | LPs | GP |
|---|---|---|---|
1 | Return of paid-in capital | $100M | $0 |
2 | 8% preferred return, as accrued | $60M | $0 |
3 | GP catch-up: 100% to the GP until it holds 20% of all profit | $0 | $15M |
4 | Remaining $125M split 80/20 | $100M | $25M |
Total | $300M distributed | $260M | $40M |
The catch-up in tier 3 is the only step that needs algebra. The GP catches up until its share equals 20% of all profit paid so far, so the catch-up x solves x = 0.2 × (60 + x), which gives $15M. After tier 4 the GP holds $40M, which is 20% of the $200M profit, and the LPs hold $260M.
| Step | Change | Running total |
|---|---|---|
| Distributions | $300M | |
| Capital back to LPs | −$100M | $200M |
| Preferred return to LPs | −$60M | $140M |
| Left to share | $140M | |
| GP catch-up | −$15M | $125M |
| Left to split 80/20 | $125M | |
| LPs' 80% | −$100M | $25M |
| GP's 20% of the rest | $25M |
Without the catch-up, the GP earns 20% only of the $140M above the hurdle, $28M, and the LPs keep $272M, so the catch-up is worth $12M to the GP here. If the fund returns only $150M, the $160M that tiers 1 and 2 need is never reached: LPs receive everything and the GP earns no carry.
A fund with no preferred return, as in an early-stage fund, sends the $100M back first and splits the remaining $200M 80/20, so the GP also earns $40M and no catch-up is needed.
I'd read the catch-up before the carry rate: at the same 20% it decides how much of the profit the GP ends up with.
Whole-fund or deal-by-deal waterfall, and where the clawback sits
The example above used a European waterfall, also called whole-fund: carry starts only after all contributed capital, and any preferred return, is back with the LPs. An American waterfall, or deal-by-deal, lets the GP take carry after a realised investment once a deal-level test is met, even though the fund as a whole hasn't returned all its capital.
This term decides when the GP is first paid and how much overdistribution risk the LPs carry. A whole-fund waterfall delays carry until the fund has shown a profit; a deal-by-deal one pays earlier, with a greater chance that the GP is paid on early winners and the later investments then fail.
“The prevalence of European waterfalls is especially notable in venture capital”
Cooley LLPPrimer: Carried Interest in Private Equity and Venture Capital Funds, 10 June 2026
In Cooley's 2026 survey of private fund terms, about 90% of the funds reviewed used a European waterfall. Venture funds make many investments over a long period, and a few winners drive the result, so they commonly use the whole-fund protection.
An American waterfall turns up more in parts of private equity, often with safeguards: Cooley's example is a test that the remaining portfolio is worth at least 125% of cost, and others use an escrow or interim clawbacks, as Cooley's carried interest primer describes.
The clawback provision is the backstop. "Most private equity and venture capital funds have some form of clawback", and it returns carry that proved too large in hindsight, usually after early winners and later losers.
In a venture fund with a whole-fund waterfall it is often assessed once, at liquidation, so the open question is who pays. Escrows are less common in many venture funds today; undertakings or guarantees from the individual carry recipients are the more common answer.
Side letters and ILPA reporting
LP-specific terms get settled in side letters, separate contracts that change the LPA for one investor, so the GP needs a register of what each letter promises. Fee discounts, waivers and caps belong in that register too: Cooley's management fee primer says they can create downstream issues unless they are coordinated with most-favored-nations rights and investor disclosure obligations.
Reporting is the term LPs have standardised. The updated ILPA Reporting Template takes over from the 2016 version for any fund whose investment period was still running in Q1 2026, and for any fund that starts operating on or after 1 January 2026. A fund that's already past its investment period by Q1 2026 may stay on the 2016 version.
A fund that starts operating now falls under the updated template, so the reporting needs building before the first close, with help from a fund administrator.
What an LP tests in your venture capital fund structure before the first meeting
Every row below is something an LP, a family office as much as an institution, can answer from your papers before the first call.
3 columns. Drag the table sideways; the first column stays put.
Item | What the LP checks | Where it sits |
|---|---|---|
Fee basis and step down | Committed or invested capital after the investment period; rate, base or double step down; offsets | Fee provisions |
GP commitment | Size against the 1% to 2% reference point, and who funds it | LPA |
Waterfall and clawback | Whole-fund or deal-by-deal; when the clawback is tested and who stands behind it | LPA |
Preferred return and catch-up | Whether a preferred return exists; full or tapered catch-up | LPA |
Reporting | Whether the manager can produce the ILPA template data | Reporting provisions |
A venture GP raising a first fund told us that LPs mostly want a repeatable track record, and that this works against newer managers with a differentiated approach. I'd expect an LP to lean on what it can check in a first fund's papers: the fee basis, the GP commitment and the waterfall.
In spectup's LP sentiment study, fewer than half of the LPs who answered are open to new managers.
How spectup runs fund placement
spectup acts for the fund manager, and only the manager pays: a retainer through the placement and a success fee that falls due when the capital is in.
On a fund placement the structure comes first: spectup works out whether it clears with LPs and which investors would underwrite it, and the manager gets a structuring memo. The offering materials follow: the private placement memorandum (PPM), deck, model and data room. The manager and its counsel negotiate the terms with each LP; spectup prepares them for that pushback and runs the placement process.
spectup drafts the PPM, and its legal and regulatory sections go to the manager's securities counsel for review. The terms stay the manager's, set with counsel and tested with LPs, and counsel forms the fund. spectup offers fund formation through a partner law firm, and the lawyers there do the legal work; spectup itself gives no legal advice.
Investor data from the transactions spectup closed holds what each investor has written and allocated to before, and an in-house signal engine watches 80+ triggers that mark the moment capital becomes allocatable: a fund closes, a partner moves, an exit frees cash. Together they build the target list by name and time it, and the approach is written to the person who signs.
Behind the list sit three layers of reach: 440+ relationships built on closed transactions, 2,500+ allocators spectup has put clients in front of, and the investor networks of 30+ partner firms. Across companies and funds, spectup has advised, raised or placed $760M+ since 2022.
When to bring in a placement agent and when to wait
Bring one in when three things hold:
The vehicle is $50M or more, the size spectup takes on for a fund placement; the write-up on placement agents in private equity covers engagement terms and fees.
The track record survives LP diligence, with every figure tied to records an LP can verify.
The calendar allows it: a fund placement typically takes eight to twelve months from engagement to close.
Wait when your fund is below $50M or when you have no records an LP can verify. In both cases the table above is the work to do first. A venture fund structure still in draft is no reason to wait: the placement can start while counsel forms the fund.
If you're unsure which side of the line you're on, one 30-minute call with us tells you whether the structure holds up with LPs and which investors would underwrite it.
Three conclusions
Two funds with the same headline fee can pay the manager differently, depending on whether the base is committed or invested capital and on how the step down works.
On the same $300M of distributions a full catch-up pays the GP $40M and no catch-up pays $28M, so the term deserves the scrutiny the carry rate gets.
In a venture fund with a whole-fund waterfall the clawback is often assessed once, at liquidation, so the open question is whether an escrow or the carry recipients' own guarantees pay it.
Venture capital fund structure: questions readers ask
6 questions on fund placement and GP capital, answered by Edwin Mik, Partner & Head of IR.
01What is a venture capital fund and how does it work?
A venture capital fund pools money from limited partners, and a general partner invests it in young companies for a management fee and a share of the profit called carried interest. The waterfall sets how proceeds go back to the LPs.
02What does 2 and 20 mean in venture capital?
A 2% annual management fee and 20% carried interest. Cooley traces the shorthand largely to private equity, and venture funds often start from a 2.5% fee on committed capital.
03What does 20% carried interest mean?
The GP keeps 20% of the fund's profit, after LPs have received their capital back and any preferred return.
04What is the difference between a hurdle rate and a preferred return?
Funds often use the two words loosely. Cooley keeps preferred return for the annual percentage on contributed capital, often historically around 8%, that LPs receive before the GP earns carry. A hurdle is a higher performance threshold such as 2.5x contributed capital, which lifts the carry rate from 20% to 25%.
05What is the 3-year rule for carried interest in the US?
Under Section 1061 of the Internal Revenue Code, gains on carried interest qualify for long-term capital gain treatment only when the underlying investment has been held for more than three years, where the general rule is one year. Partners should ask their tax counsel how it applies to them.
06When should a fund manager hire a private placement agent?
When the vehicle is $50M or more and the track record can survive LP diligence. The structure can still be in draft, because the placement can start while counsel forms the fund. A fund placement typically takes eight to twelve months from engagement to close, so the calendar has to allow for it.

Edwin Mik
Partner & Head of IR
Formerly at Barclays, Apax Partners and Euronext, Edwin knows how investors screen a raise. He works out who is allocating now, which of the 440+ relationships is the right first call, and what they need to see.
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